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Indonesia 1965
A power move with far-reaching implications
By Clinton Fernandes
On September 1, 1965, the US State
Department prepared a Special National
Intelligence Estimate for Indonesia. Written by the Central
Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organisations of the
Departments of State and Defence and the National Security Agency, it
assessed the prospects for, and strategic implications of, a
communist takeover in Indonesia.
It
assessed that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was “by far
the best organised and most dynamic entity in Indonesia”.1
Only a few months later, the PKI would cease to exist. Its
destruction, according to former US ambassador Marshall Green, “was
a momentous event in world affairs, and I don’t think that the
press and the public has ever seen it that way”.2
This
article will discuss aspects of that event.3
Indonesia after independence
Indonesian
independence was proclaimed on August 17, 1945. There followed a
four-year guerrilla war to defeat Dutch attempts to recolonise the
territory. The Dutch conceded defeat in 1949, and Indonesia’s
political independence was assured. The newly independent state
assigned a high priority to the education of its population,
establishing schools and literacy programs at a rapid rate. It was
quite successful in its efforts: in 1950, basic literacy was
estimated at about 10 per cent of the population and only 230
Indonesians had
received tertiary education. Ten years later, almost every village
had a school and basic literacy was nearly 80 per cent. Tertiary
education
had also shot up dramatically.
Formal
schooling was only one aspect of the new, post-independence culture.
The public began to participate in politics to a much greater extent.
Centuries of colonisation had stifled popular involvement in the
social, political and cultural spheres. Such involvement had grown
fitfully in the final decades of the independence struggle, although
colonial repression remained a significant constraining factor. With
political independence, however, a more participatory culture took
shape. The social and cultural spheres were occupied by numerous
organisations such as credit unions, chess clubs, prayer groups,
housewives’ associations, cultural groups, worker and peasant
unions, youth groups and student bodies. These diverse organisations
were associated with certain political parties. The combination of
political party and associated organisations came to be known as
cultural streams or ‘aliran’. The
years after
independence brought the growth of several such aliran, which
were
an everyday affair ie more than simply a machine for generating
votes in the lead-up to an election campaign. Many Indonesian
citizens saw these aliran as constituting their primary
identity. As a result, political life beame connected to the
population’s social and cultural life.
Australian
planners recognised that Indonesia had "a strong Communist
Party with considerable prospects of increasing its popular appeal".4
The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) defended the interests of the
poor and was rapidly increasing its support among landless peasants.
The PKI was allied with the left wing of the Indonesian Nationalist
Party (PNI). Under this allied leadership, an organised movement of
workers and peasants campaigned for the redistribution of land in the
countryside, the nationalisation of foreign companies and greater
economic equality. It opposed the US war in Vietnam and supported
national liberation movements around the world.
The
PKI was no tool of China or the Soviet Union, however. According to a
standard source on the subject, the PKI "had won widespread
support not as a revolutionary party but as an organisation defending
the interests of the poor within the existing system".
As the US’s Special National Intelligence Estimate put it,
should the PKI come to power, its "foreign policy decisions …
would stress Indonesian national interests above those of Peking,
Moscow, or international communism in general". It "would
be sufficiently nationalistic to refuse to grant air or naval bases
or missile sites to either Moscow or Peking".6
The
Australian government viewed the PKI’s growing support with
alarm. Australian strategic planners shared this concern, warning
that a communist victory "would be a considerable blow to
Western prestige in South East Asia and would assist in the growth of
Communist and neutralist sentiment throughout the area".7
Subsequent analysis by US intelligence agreed, observing that in the
longer term "Indonesia would provide a powerful example for the
underdeveloped world and hence a credit to communism and a setback
for Western prestige."8
The
reference to "neutralist sentiment" is instructive. As a
leading anti-colonialist advocate and founding member of the
Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia wielded great influence in the Third
World. Australian planners feared that other countries would join it
in pursuing similar goals and choose their own path of economic and
social development. By the mid-1950s, Indonesia’s
non-alignment, coupled with the growing popularity of the PKI, was a
matter of serious concern to Western policymakers. US President
Eisenhower wondered out loud, ‘Why the hell did we ever urge
the Dutch to get out of Indonesia?’9
The US, with Australian participation, tried to break up Indonesia by
encouraging an outer islands rebellion on Sumatra and Sulawesi. The
Indonesian military demonstrated its strength by crushing this
rebellion. The US therefore realised the importance of cultivating
the military, and began providing it with limited military aid in
order to sustain anti-communist elements in the officer corps.
Until
1957 the PKI had been excluded from government, but it benefited from
the system of so-called Guided Democracy. This system was proposed by
President Sukarno, who argued that the indigenous Indonesian way of
deciding important questions was to have extensive deliberation
(musyawarah) designed to achieve a consensus (mufakat).
Since this "democracy with guidance" operated at the
village level, he argued that it should be the model for the nation.
Guided Democracy would consist of a government based on the four main
political parties plus a national council representing the parties
and "functional groups" — workers,
peasants,
entrepreneurs, intellectuals, religious bodies, youth groups, women’s
groups, and so on. Under presidential guidance, a national consensus
could be formulated.
From 1957 onwards,
Dutch-owned assets in Indonesia were occupied in a series of direct
actions, and then nationalised as part of a campaign for the recovery
of West Irian. The army took over the management of these
plantations, mines and other estates. Military entrepreneurs began to
play a strong role in the domestic economy. (In later years, it
became customary to attribute the decline in the productivity of
these assets to the influence of the PKI. In fact, however, they
declined under military management.) The influence of the PKI
continued to increase. Its members began to hold a range of
bureaucratic and political posts. From 1957, several cities on Java
had communist mayors and several provincial governors were close to
the party. However, the PKI and the left wing of the PNI did not
occupy any but the most symbolic positions in Cabinet. Control over
the productive capacity of the economy rested in the hands of senior
bureaucrats and military officers, who did not support Sukarno’s
economic program. It was they — not Sukarno or the PKI —
who implemented strategic economic decisions. As for Cabinet, it too
disagreed with Sukarno in the economic sphere.
When John F. Kennedy
became president of the United States, there was a tactical shift in
US policy towards Indonesia. Kennedy and several of his key officials
on the National Security Council believed that Eisenhower’s
approach had been counter-productive, driving Indonesia even further
away from US influence. They therefore used a more tolerant rhetoric
toward the Non-Aligned Movement, and received Sukarno amiably in
Washington in April 1961. The Dutch were persuaded to leave West
Irian soon after.
Growth of the Indonesian Communist Party
Between 1960 and 1965, the PKI and its allied
peasant organisations began to carry out a program of land seizures
in order to make landlords comply with existing laws. These actions
resulted in violent responses by landlords, and fights between
security forces and peasants. Mass mobilisations began to increase
very rapidly, with large protests in the main cities and a growing
number of smaller protests in other towns and villages. The party
also took up the cause of plantation and industrial workers in North
Sumatra, and of Javanese migrants in North and South Sumatra. It
supported Hindus against East Javanese orthodox Muslims who were
members of the local elite, as well as opponents of Hindu priestly
authority in Bali. All this grassroots activity contributed to a
major increase in the membership of the PKI and the left wing of the
PNI. By 1965, the PKI had three million members and was said to be
the largest communist party in the world outside the Soviet Union and
China. In addition to its vast membership, more than 15 million
people had indirect connections to it through their membership of the
peasant associations, labour unions and other affiliates.
The PKI was opposed by sections of the commercial
and land-owning establishment, senior figures in the bureaucratic
apparatus, and a number of right-wing intellectuals and students.
This conservative alliance also had the support of a large number of
smaller Islamic parties. Crucially, it was backed by the powerful –
and increasingly apprehensive – Indonesian military. While
there were important left-wing and populist forces within the army
itself, the right wing was always stronger. Indeed the army had
demonstrated its power and right-wing credentials in 1948 when it put
down an uprising supported by the PKI in the Madiun region of Central
Java. The divisions in Indonesian society were reflected in an
increasingly tense situation inside the army as well. In subsequent
years, particularly from 1962-65, there were sharp internal struggles
between left-wing populists and right-wing forces within the army.
In late 1963, US policy became more aggressive.
Lyndon Johnson had succeeded Kennedy as president, and his "personal
antipathy toward Sukarno, along with several important bureaucratic
changes … combined to introduce a far less forgiving stance
toward Indonesian actions in the Far East Bureau of the State
Department and on McGeorge Bundy's National Security Council (NSC)
staff’".10
This policy shift coincided with regional friction as Indonesia
challenged Britain's role in the creation of Malaysia. In March next
year, after an American magazine called for the US to end all aid
unless Indonesian attacks on Malaysia were halted, Sukarno said in a
speech in Jakarta that he would tell any country that tried to attach
strings to its foreign assistance, "You can go to hell with
your aid." This remark (made in English) was widely reported in
the US. All US aid came to an end, except for "military
assistance" intended for the Indonesian army.
Western
intelligence analysts turned their attention to Sukarno, describing
him as an "intuitive politician" and a "mass
leader of extraordinary skill". State Department analysts
believed that Sukarno operated according to "opportunistic,
play-it-by-ear policies rather than by a long-range fixed plan".
The CIA concluded that his "Marxist inclination"’ were "largely
emotionally based". It characterised his
relationship with the Communists as one of "mutual
exploitation". Sukarno needed the PKI because he lacked a mass
political organisation of his own; the PKI needed Sukarno for
protection against the army. As for the army, Sukarno used it to
counterbalance the PKI, and the army saw Sukarno as the best person
to hold the far-flung and diverse parts of Indonesia together.11
Strengthening the Indonesian military
It
became clear to US policymakers that the Indonesian army’s hand
would have to be strengthened. US ambassador to Malaysia James Bell,
who had had considerable previous Indonesian experience, suggested
reassuring the army that the West would not interfere if it moved
against the PKI: "If we can give them this kind of shot in the
arm they might have more inclination to act."12
McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to President Johnson, sent
Bell’s memo to Chester Cooper, his senior assistant on the Far
East. He wrote, "Cooper: It makes sense to me. Can we do it?
MG.B." US ambassador to Indonesia Howard Jones argued against
Bell, warning that such an approach "would rebound as [an]
unwarranted attempt [to] interfere internally". Cooper
therefore wrote back to Bundy, attaching his note to the cables from
Bell and Jones: "Mac — You asked my views
on the coming
from Malaya (attached). I have brooded and have checked around and
agree with Jones. Chet."13
Ambassador
Jones approached a friendly Indonesian diplomat, asking what would
happen if Sukarno were "suddenly removed from the scene".
The diplomat predicted a polarisation of the country around Defence
Minister Nasution and D.N. Aidit, the head of the PKI. He said that
General Nasution was "the strongest man in the country"
who had the loyalty of the officer corps. Jones visited Nasution
three days later, asking him "whether some military leaders
welcomed the disintegration of the economy on the theory that the PKI
would make a bid for power and the military could then crack down on
the PKI". Nasution "avoided like the plague any
discussion of a possible military takeover, even though this hovered
in the air throughout the talk, and at no time did he pick up obvious
hints of US support in time of crisis". But Nasution had
obviously talked it over with his fellow generals, for they met two
weeks later. This time Nasution assured the ambassador that the
military was "strongly pro-US and anti-PKI". He said the
PKI was probably unprepared to make a bid for power, but if it did, "Madiun would be mild compared with an army
crackdown today."14.
The US kept encouraging the Indonesian military to increase the
pressure on Sukarno. The 303 Committee of the National Security
Council approved a CIA-State Department political action program
aimed at portraying the PKI "as an increasingly ambitious,
dangerous opponent of Sukarno and legitimate nationalism and
instrument of Chinese neo-imperialism".15
Western policymakers knew that it would be folly to take on Sukarno
directly because of his tremendous popularity.
In
April 1965, President Johnson dispatched his special envoy Ellsworth
Bunker to Indonesia. Bunker reported back that relations with
Indonesia were unlikely to improve. He confirmed that Sukarno "is
still the symbol for Indonesian unity and independence, believes in
himself and his destiny, and is able and shrewd. There is little
question of his continued hold on the loyalty of the Indonesian
people, who in large measure look to him for leadership, trust his
leadership, and are willing to follow him. No force in this country
can attack him nor is there evidence that any significant group would
want to do so."16
As for the PKI, Bunker argued that its strengths were "powerful
organisation", "brilliant manipulation of other political
forces", "dominance in the labour field", and "virtual control of the
national press and radio". Its
weaknesses were that: "The bulk of its strength is in Java, a
handicap in a country where animosity against Javanese is strong in
the outer islands; it has no paramilitary arm to challenge the army,
although it is now making strong efforts to build one; and its
freedom of action remains limited by the need to continue a
subservient posture toward Sukarno."17
Indonesia’s
poor economic performance under military management was compounded by
the fact that sales of rubber, its major export earner, were
shrinking as a result of competition from synthetic alternatives.
Indonesia was therefore deprived of an important source of foreign
currency. Despite the economic problems, Bunker noted the country’s
"resilience to economic adversity" because "over
half the population live outside the monetised sector of the economy
as self-sufficient farmers".18
As for the Indonesian government, it "occupies a dominant
position in basic industry, public utilities, internal transportation
and communication". Bunker warned that should the drift towards
PKI dominance continue: "It is probable that private ownership
will disappear and may be succeeded by some form of
production-profit-sharing contract arrangements to be applied to all
foreign investment." In Bunker’s assessment: "The
avowed Indonesian objective is 'to stand on their own feet'
in developing their economy, free from foreign, especially Western,
influence."19
Bunker
advised that the US should reduce its visibility "so that those
opposed to the communists and extremists may be free to handle a
confrontation, which they believe will come, without the incubus of
being attacked as defenders of the neo-colonialists and
imperialists".20
He warned against any attempt to foment military rebellion along the
lines of 1958 because "the ideal of national unity is an
overriding obsession with practically all Indonesians, stronger by
far than any real divisive regional feeling".21
Accordingly,
the US adopted a "low silhouette" policy; its official
presence "shrank from over 400 in April to only 35 in August.
But the CIA station maintained its staff of 12, including its full
complement of eight clandestine operatives responsible for intelligence
collection and, on occasion, covert action. Similarly, the top
personnel in the Embassy’s political section and the military
attaches remained."22
Soon after, Marshall Green replaced Howard Jones as the new
ambassador to Indonesia. He arrived in Jakarta on July 23, 1965.23
Green "had the complete trust of the State Department",
which "never moved a muscle without his advice".24
The mutiny
Tensions within a
now thoroughly polarised Indonesian society continued to build, until
they exploded into open conflict on the evening of September 30, 1965,
when a small number of middle-ranking, left-wing army officers staged
a mutiny. The mutineers killed six generals (Yani, Suprapto, Parman,
Sutojo, Harjono and Panjaitan) and a lieutenant (Tendean). The
circumstances of this mutiny have never been fully explained, but
there are good reasons to believe that it was designed to prevent a
coup by a right-wing Council of Generals. However, the mutineers —
led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, a left-wing commander in the
Presidential Guard — failed to arrest key generals, including
Major General Suharto. Strong evidence suggests that Suharto had been
tipped off beforehand about the mutiny.
The
mutiny did not appear to have planned in much detail — no
serious measures were taken to seize choke points in the capital. The
worker and peasant movements had been given no forewarning, and most
of them were caught unawares. The PKI did not try to mobilise its
massive party membership. According to a US clandestine
source, the PKI central committee reacted only after hearing the
mutineers’ radio broadcast. Sir Andrew Gilchrist, the British
ambassador, also suspected that the PKI had not been kept in the
loop, joining in only "because they feared that if the army
crushed Untung it would crush them as well".25
The Australian Joint Intelligence Committee noted that while
individual communist groups clearly participated in the mutiny,
"evidence of actual PKI involvement —
that is, of prior
planning by the Central Committee — is
largely
circumstantial".26
The
US appears to have been caught by surprise.27
One of its diplomats saw roadblocks and unusual military activity as
he went to work on the morning of October 1, 1965. At first he assumed
that Sukarno had died or become incapacitated. So did other US
diplomats, who did not know much about Major-General Suharto. There
was more than one Suharto in the senior ranks of the army, and at
first they misidentified him. Similarly, the CIA’s research
bureau knew little of Suharto or his politics; all it could say of
him in the initial period was that he was "considered to be an
anti-Communist"28 — not very
illuminating, considering his profession and rank.
US analysts later realised that five of the six generals killed had
been trained in the US. Suharto himself had not trained in the US but
thirteen of his top aides had.29
The crackdown
The
Indonesian military moved swiftly and decisively. It arrested PKI
members and took control of the media, using Radio Indonesia and the
Antara news agency to encourage anti-PKI action. A major theme in its
propaganda campaign was the murder of the six Indonesian generals.
The military claimed that the generals were tortured and their
genitals cut off by members of the PKI-affiliated women’s
organisation Gerwani. Major-General Suharto said that "it
was obvious for those of us who saw [the bodies] with our own eyes
what savage tortures had been inflicted by the barbarous adventurers
calling themselves 'The September 30th Movement'".30
Autopsies — ordered personally by
Major-General Suharto —
revealed that these stories were false, but the propaganda continued.
(According to the autopsies, none of the victims’ eyes had
been gouged out, and all their penises were intact.31) Sukarno and his foreign minister Subandrio tried to
inform the
public that the post mortem certificates had not mentioned any
abnormalities, but the army was firmly in command of the media and
these messages did not get through32.
Through
the Antara news agency, the Indonesian military claimed that the PKI
had drawn up lists of hundreds of government officials marked for
execution if the mutineers had succeeded.33
Other stories claimed that members of PKI youth organisation Pemuda
Rakyat had kidnapped two youths in Sumatra and tortured them for
five days, removing eyes and cutting off hands and testicles, before
killing them. It was also claimed that other Pemuda Rakyat
members had tortured and murdered Muslims praying on the bank of a
river.34
Other, extremely successful, propaganda stories alleged that PKI
leader Aidit had encouraged Gerwani and Pemuda Rakyat
members to take part in "delirious sexual orgies" for six
months before the mutiny.35
Full-scale
massacres of PKI members across the Indonesian archipelago occurred
when special forces or parachute troops went into the regions. These
soldiers participated in the killings, but more frequently used local
militias to liquidate suspected PKI sympathisers. Local military
units made it clear that they wanted to annihilate the PKI. They
provided weapons, equipment, training and encouragement to youth
organisations, eg the Muslim Ansor in Central and East Java. These
groups usually went from village to village, grabbing PKI members and
taking them away to be murdered. In some cases, entire villages were
obliterated, but more typically the killers used hit lists and local
informants to identify their victims. Particular attention was given
to teachers and other village intellectuals. According to
declassified British reports, many of the victims were the "merest
rank and file" of the PKI, who were "often no more than
bewildered peasants who give the wrong answer on a dark night to
bloodthirsty hooligans bent on violence".36
According to British historian Mark Curtis, an Australian diplomat
learnt that: "Torture was the customary prelude to death and was
in fact carried out in the army establishment next door to his own
home. The nightly executions, carried out just outside Kupang, were
open to the public provided those who attended took part in the
executions. The Army was in complete control of these operations."37
Robert
Cribb, a leading scholar on these events, writes that the killings
were "largely done with knives or swords, but some victims were
beaten to death and some were shot. In some cases the victims were
forced to dig their own shallow, mass graves in secluded places, or
the bodies were dumped in rivers, or concealed in caves … The
regions most seriously affected were Central and East Java, Bali and
North Sumatra, where the [PKI] had been most active, but there were
massacres in every part of the archipelago where communists could be
found. A scholarly consensus has settled on a figure of
400,000-500,000 deaths."38
Western support
Western policymakers
and diplomats were keen to support the army, but there was a problem:
Sukarno’s previous anti-imperialist rhetoric had resonated
strongly with the Indonesian public. Any overt support would
therefore serve only to expose the army as a tool of the West.
Sukarno’s towering reputation presented a significant obstacle.
A deft touch was required.
US
ambassador Marshall Green understood that economic aid should not be
offered because economic difficulties hurt the reputation of the
civilian administration, not the army. His military contacts told him
that there was an urgent need for food and clothing in Indonesia but
it was more important to let Sukarno and Subandrio "stew in
their own juice".39
The
information campaign in support of the killings was informed by
similar principles. The Indonesian army secretly urged that foreign
broadcasts not give the army "too much credit" or
criticise Sukarno; rather, they should emphasise PKI atrocities and
the party’s role in the mutiny.40
While Sukarno could not be directly attacked, an Indonesian general
offered to send background information on foreign minister Subandrio,
who was regarded as more vulnerable. Australian ambassador Keith
Shann was told that Radio Australia should never suggest that the
army was pro-Western or right-wing. Instead, credit should be given
to other organisations, such as Muslim and youth groups.41
Radio
Australia had an important role to play because of its overwhelming
popularity with Indonesian listeners. It was said to be more popular
than Radio Indonesia because its listeners included both the elite
and students, who liked it because it played rock music, which had
been officially banned.42
Australia’s Department of External Affairs (as it was then
known) was aware that its high signal strength and massive listening
audience meant that its Indonesian broadcasts were "a
particularly important instrumentality in the present situation".
It was therefore told to "be on guard against giving
information to the Indonesian people that would be withheld by the
Army-controlled internal media". The Australian ambassador
worked to ensure that it gave "prominent coverage" to "reports of PKI
involvement and Communist Chinese complicity"
while playing down or not broadcasting "reports of divisions
within the army specifically and armed services more generally".
Another senior official recommended that Radio Australia "not
do anything which would be helpful to the PKI"; rather it "should
highlight reports tending to discredit the PKI and show
its involvement in the losing cause".43
The
US, Britain and Australia co-operated closely in the propaganda
effort. Marshall Green urged Washington to "Spread the story of
PKI’s guilt, treachery and brutality", adding that this
was "perhaps the most needed immediate assistance we can give
army if we can find [a] way to do it without identifying it as [a]
sole or largely US effort".44
The British Foreign Office hoped to "encourage anti-Communist
Indonesians to more vigorous action in the hope of crushing Communism
in Indonesia altogether". Britain would emphasise "PKI
brutality in murdering Generals and families, Chinese interference,
particularly arms shipments, PKI subverting Indonesia as the agents
of foreign Communists".45
British ambassador Sir Andrew Gilchrist wrote: "I have
never concealed … my belief that a little shooting in
Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change."46
Throughout this period, Western radio
stations
continued to recycle stories from Radio Jakarta or the army
newspapers and broadcast them back to Indonesia. US Embassy officials
established a back-channel link through the US army attache in
Jakarta, who regularly met with an aide to General Nasution.
The
US Embassy also compiled lists of PKI leaders and thousands of senior
members and handed them over to the Indonesian military.47
While these kinds of lists were based entirely on previous reporting
by the communist press, they proved invaluable to the military which
seemed "to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI
leadership at the time".48
General
Sukendro secretly approached the US Embassy, asking for assistance in
the army’s operations against the PKI. Marshall Green advised
the State Department that "we should do what we can as soon as
we can, to meet request for medical supplies. Cost is not prohibitive
and quantity is such that both finance and shipping could probably be
handled covertly."49
As for the army’s requests for small arms, Green said that he "would be
leery about telling army we are in position to
provide same, although we should act, not close our minds to this
possibility. There is a chance that situation in central Java might
take such a turn for the worse that we would wish to move quickly
with packages of certain types of arms. Meanwhile, we could explore
availability of small arms stocks, preferable of non-US origin, which
could, if necessary, provide covert assistance to army for purchase
of weapons."50
Green also authorised the provision of 50 million rupiahs to the Kap-Gestapu
movement, which was leading the crackdown. He
advised the State Department that there was "no doubt
whatsoever that Kap-Gestapu’s activity is fully consonant with
and co-ordinated by the army. We have had substantial intelligence
reporting to support this."51
Overall, the US provided the Indonesian army with money, medicines,
communications equipment, weapons and intelligence. It was satisfied
with the return it received on this investment. As Marshall Green put
it, the Embassy and the US government are "generally
sympathetic with and admiring of what army [is] doing".52
It would be necessary "to lay [the] foundation of understanding
between us" in order to "make it easier for us to act
effectively if at some future date army should want help from US".
There were potential problems that needed sorting out. "One
such problem was [the] position [of] American oil companies."53
On February 21, 1966,
Sukarno tried to reshuffle his cabinet and sack General Nasution as
Defence Minister. But with the public cowed in fear of the killings,
his attempt to assert his authority failed. There were large
demonstrations backed by the army, and on March 11, 1966, armed troops
mounted a show of force outside the presidential palace. Sukarno
capitulated and signed a letter of authority handing over executive
power to General Suharto.
The aftermath
In the wake of the
massacres, Indonesia’s pre-eminent cultural and intellectual
organisations — the Peoples’ Cultural Institute, the
National Cultural Institute, and the Indonesian Scholars’
Association — were shut down, and many of their members were
arrested or imprisoned. More than one and a half million Indonesians
passed through a system of prisons and prison camps. The PKI was
physically annihilated, and popular organisations associated with it
were suppressed. The whole of Indonesian society was forcibly
depoliticised. In village after village, local bureaucrats backed by
the army imposed a control matrix of permits, rules and regulations.
Citizens were required to obtain a "letter of clean
circumstances" certifying that they and their extended families
had not been associated with the left before 1965. Indonesian society
became devoted to the prevention of any challenge to elite interests.
Control of the
universities, newspapers, and cultural institutions was handed to
conservative writers and intellectuals, who collaborated with the New
Order’s program and did not oppose the jailing of their
left-wing cultural rivals. Along with the violence, certain cultural
values were strongly promoted — discussion of personal,
religious and consumerist issues was encouraged, while discussion of
politics was considered to be in bad taste. The conservative
establishment also monopolised Indonesia’s external cultural
relations.
Suharto would rule for
more than 30 years until a popular uprising and a crisis-ridden
economy forced his resignation on May 21, 1998.
Dr
Clinton Fernandes is a historian and author of Reluctant Saviour:
Australia, Indonesia and the independence of East Timor (Scribe,
2004). He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Australian
National University. These are his views.
Notes
1
Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXVI (FRUS),
pp289-292.
2
National Security Archive 15 January 1997, Interview with Marshall
Green, Episode 15.
3
I have borrowed in part from Reluctant Saviour: Australia,
Indonesia and the Independence of East Timor (Scribe, 2004).
4
Department of Defence 1958, Importance of Indonesia to Australia
and Regional Defence.
5
H. Crouch 1978, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, p 351.
7
Department of Defence 1958, Importance of Indonesia to Australia
and Regional Defence.
9
M. Jones 2002, US relations with Indonesia,
the Kennedy-Johnson Transition, and the Vietnam Connection, 1963-1965,
Diplomatic History Vol 26 No 2, p 253 n14.
10
M. Jones 2002, US relations with Indonesia,
the Kennedy-Johnson Transition, and the Vietnam Connection, 1963-1965,
Diplomatic History Vol 26 No 2.
11
H. Brands 1989, The Limits of Manipulation, Journal of American
History, Vol 76, p 792.
12
F. Bunnell 1990, American ‘low posture’ policy toward Indonesia in
the months leading to the 1965 coup, Indonesia No.50, p 35.
14
H. Brands 1989, The Limits of Manipulation, Journal of American
History, Vol 76, pp 793-4.
15
D. Easter 2005, ‘Keep the Indonesian Pot
Boiling’: Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965 –
March 1965, Cold War History Vol 5, No 1, p 58.
27
According to that day’s CIA Situation Report, ‘A power move which may
have far-reaching implications is under way in Jakarta’. Source: FRUS,
p 300.
30
B. Anderson 1987, How did the generals die?, Indonesia, p 110.
31
B. Anderson 1987, p 111.
36
M. Curtis 2003, Web of Deceit: Britain’s real role in the world,
Vintage, p 392.
37
M. Curtis 2003, p 392.
38
R. Cribb 2001, Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966, Journal of
Genocide Research, 3(2), 219-239.
43
K. Najjarine and D. Cottle 2003, The DEA, the ABC and Reporting of
the Indonesian Crisis 1965-1969, Australian Journal of Politics and
History vol 49 no 1, pp 48-60.
53
FRUS, p 355.
Madiun.
An uprising in eastern Java in September 1948 that was crushed by the
military and resulted in the death of PKI leader Musso and the capture
and execution of Trotskyist leader Tan Malaka. This led the US to
change its view of the republicans, which it had previously viewed as
communist.
Dr Clinton Fernandes is a
historian and author of Reluctant
Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the Independence of East Timor
(Scribe, 2004). He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Australian
National University. These are his views.
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