John Searle on Consciousness
I took a break from reading Chalmers' book, and quickly read a much smaller volume (and much easier to read) by John Searle called "The Mystery of Consciousness". Searle writes very clearly, soen't over use philosphosical terms (he explains them when he does) and so does a great job at tacking the issues in this great debate. The book is interesting because he reviews the views of 6 other writers on Conciousness, and explains where he thinks they are right, and where they go wrong (in his view, of course).
The authors he discusses are Francis Crick (of DNA fame), Gerald Edelman, Roger Penrose, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers and Israel RosenField.
Searle believes that Consciousness is a biological phenomenon. He believes that Crick, Edelman and Penrose are all on the right track, although he has probelms with all their attempts to explain consciousness. The key thing is that he believes they are on the right track because they are looking for an explanation in the workings of the brain. He thinks Dennett has missed the point, because he believes Dennett is saying that there is no such thing as Consciousness. (I think that is misrespresenting his views). He thinks Chalmers is off with the fairies because for Chalmers, Consciousness is some kind of fundamental informational aspect of the universe - ie Chalmers is a kind of dualist.
An especially interesting part of the book is that both Dennett and Chalmers reply to Searle's comments, and then Searle makes his rejoinder - all of which is included in the book.
It is only about 200 pages long (small paperback format), and easy to read; if you are interested in this subject, I highly recommend it.
As an aside, I find it curious to see how much they all actually do agree in many things - eg all of them say consciousness is biological, but they put different meanings into that description. For Penrose, the biological bit is actually a quantum effect in structures called "microtubules" in the brain. For Crick, it has something to do with 40 Hertz electrical oscillations in the brain. For Chalmers, its the "informational aspect" of the neuronal processes. The biggest objection, I think, that he has of Chalmers is that Chalmers must accept that everything is in some sense conscious - even rocks - because everything has some level of "information" coded. This is called pan-psychism, and Searle believes this is simply absurd (I think I agree). Chalmers answers that he doesn't necessarily agree with the conclusion, but admits to its possibility.
There is also a lot of discussion about computer models of the consciousness - Penrose says consciousness is "non-computable" - hence he is looking at quantum effects, I suppose. Penrose says a computer could never be conscious. Dennett certainly thinks that in principle they can,; his model of consciousness is a sort of "virtual machine" software implemented in biology. I'm not sure about Chalmers, but I think he also believes that it is possible in principle.
I took a break from reading Chalmers' book, and quickly read a much smaller volume (and much easier to read) by John Searle called "The Mystery of Consciousness". Searle writes very clearly, soen't over use philosphosical terms (he explains them when he does) and so does a great job at tacking the issues in this great debate. The book is interesting because he reviews the views of 6 other writers on Conciousness, and explains where he thinks they are right, and where they go wrong (in his view, of course).
The authors he discusses are Francis Crick (of DNA fame), Gerald Edelman, Roger Penrose, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers and Israel RosenField.
Searle believes that Consciousness is a biological phenomenon. He believes that Crick, Edelman and Penrose are all on the right track, although he has probelms with all their attempts to explain consciousness. The key thing is that he believes they are on the right track because they are looking for an explanation in the workings of the brain. He thinks Dennett has missed the point, because he believes Dennett is saying that there is no such thing as Consciousness. (I think that is misrespresenting his views). He thinks Chalmers is off with the fairies because for Chalmers, Consciousness is some kind of fundamental informational aspect of the universe - ie Chalmers is a kind of dualist.
An especially interesting part of the book is that both Dennett and Chalmers reply to Searle's comments, and then Searle makes his rejoinder - all of which is included in the book.
It is only about 200 pages long (small paperback format), and easy to read; if you are interested in this subject, I highly recommend it.
As an aside, I find it curious to see how much they all actually do agree in many things - eg all of them say consciousness is biological, but they put different meanings into that description. For Penrose, the biological bit is actually a quantum effect in structures called "microtubules" in the brain. For Crick, it has something to do with 40 Hertz electrical oscillations in the brain. For Chalmers, its the "informational aspect" of the neuronal processes. The biggest objection, I think, that he has of Chalmers is that Chalmers must accept that everything is in some sense conscious - even rocks - because everything has some level of "information" coded. This is called pan-psychism, and Searle believes this is simply absurd (I think I agree). Chalmers answers that he doesn't necessarily agree with the conclusion, but admits to its possibility.
There is also a lot of discussion about computer models of the consciousness - Penrose says consciousness is "non-computable" - hence he is looking at quantum effects, I suppose. Penrose says a computer could never be conscious. Dennett certainly thinks that in principle they can,; his model of consciousness is a sort of "virtual machine" software implemented in biology. I'm not sure about Chalmers, but I think he also believes that it is possible in principle.
posted by Vergil | 5:07 PM
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