More Stray Thoughts - Thinking about Consciousness
AKMA reminded me of a discussion on David Weinberger's weblog back in June 2003 which I contributed to. I am embarrassed a little by some of the things I wrote then - not because I've changed my mind, but because as I re-read all the comments, I realised I hadn't paid attention to everything that was said by others. Its funny how looking at something again, much later, gives you new thoughts and you do see things differently. Perhaps its just the way I am, ie, not very good at off the cuff comments that make much sense. But as long as its understood that its OK to evolve your thinking in this public sort of way, then writing such things in blogs can be accepted for what it is, thoughts in progress.
One of David Weinberger's phrases struck me as interesting with regard to computers and consciousness :
"This doesn't mean that only carbon-based flesh like ours can be conscious. But it does mean that patterns aren't enough and that there's something special — not necessarily unique — about flesh."
The context was a discussion of Wolfram's book "A New Kind of Science" and whether or not computer programs can ever be conscious, in the way humans are. David agrees with philospher John Searle that it is all biological, that there is "something special about flesh" which enables conscious experience to happen, and along with Searle, denies that computers can be conscious because computers are just symbol manipulators. They might do a good job simulating conscious acts, but they can never be "really" conscious. Another important aspect in David's thinking is that brain processes are not only biological, but "causal". I think he means to contrast this with computers, which are slavishly following a program. So with this thought, it doesn't matter how complex the program is, or how clever the input/ouput devices are, it is still "just a program" (meaning it is still just manipulating symbols).
I am interested in why there is this insistance that "just manipulating symbols" cannot be at the heart of conscious experience in the brain. I am interested in why there must be something "special about flesh". To me it looks all for all the world like a modern and sophisticated version of dualism - although David makes it clear he does not believe there is anything like "pixie dust" or the "elan vital" equivalent for conscious experience.
I weakly attempted to explain it all away originally by saying, in effect, "its the complexity". David dismissed this out of hand. I am not surprised, because I didn't really say much about what I meant by complexity. I can understand that if you say a computer just manipulates symbols, then it would seem reasonable that it doesn't matter how complicated the resulting patterns are, they are still just arbitrary patterns of symbols (David's which-way-the- M&Ms-face argument).
This argument really brings us back to John Searle's "Chinese Room" thought experiment, which is the classic argument against "strong AI" - the kind of AI which would allow for conscious, thinking computers. The Chinese Room is a very powerful idea, but I am still flabbergasted that anyone thinks it proves anything at all about AI. I feel really weird about making an assertion like that, because John Searle is a professional philosopher, whereas I do things like consulting on IT matters for companies. I never did philosophy at uni, and really only lately took it up as a distraction against the stresses of running computer systems.
So this is the beginning. I want to start putting down my thinking in this public space, and see if I can evolve a point of view that makes some sense (at least to me), can stand up to reasonable criticism, and leave things open where they should be left open. Doing it in a blog will help me think about it more clearly, even if no-one other than me is reading this!
Anyone who wishes to put some points of view is welcome, of course. Who knows, I might learn something.
AKMA reminded me of a discussion on David Weinberger's weblog back in June 2003 which I contributed to. I am embarrassed a little by some of the things I wrote then - not because I've changed my mind, but because as I re-read all the comments, I realised I hadn't paid attention to everything that was said by others. Its funny how looking at something again, much later, gives you new thoughts and you do see things differently. Perhaps its just the way I am, ie, not very good at off the cuff comments that make much sense. But as long as its understood that its OK to evolve your thinking in this public sort of way, then writing such things in blogs can be accepted for what it is, thoughts in progress.
One of David Weinberger's phrases struck me as interesting with regard to computers and consciousness :
"This doesn't mean that only carbon-based flesh like ours can be conscious. But it does mean that patterns aren't enough and that there's something special — not necessarily unique — about flesh."
The context was a discussion of Wolfram's book "A New Kind of Science" and whether or not computer programs can ever be conscious, in the way humans are. David agrees with philospher John Searle that it is all biological, that there is "something special about flesh" which enables conscious experience to happen, and along with Searle, denies that computers can be conscious because computers are just symbol manipulators. They might do a good job simulating conscious acts, but they can never be "really" conscious. Another important aspect in David's thinking is that brain processes are not only biological, but "causal". I think he means to contrast this with computers, which are slavishly following a program. So with this thought, it doesn't matter how complex the program is, or how clever the input/ouput devices are, it is still "just a program" (meaning it is still just manipulating symbols).
I am interested in why there is this insistance that "just manipulating symbols" cannot be at the heart of conscious experience in the brain. I am interested in why there must be something "special about flesh". To me it looks all for all the world like a modern and sophisticated version of dualism - although David makes it clear he does not believe there is anything like "pixie dust" or the "elan vital" equivalent for conscious experience.
I weakly attempted to explain it all away originally by saying, in effect, "its the complexity". David dismissed this out of hand. I am not surprised, because I didn't really say much about what I meant by complexity. I can understand that if you say a computer just manipulates symbols, then it would seem reasonable that it doesn't matter how complicated the resulting patterns are, they are still just arbitrary patterns of symbols (David's which-way-the- M&Ms-face argument).
This argument really brings us back to John Searle's "Chinese Room" thought experiment, which is the classic argument against "strong AI" - the kind of AI which would allow for conscious, thinking computers. The Chinese Room is a very powerful idea, but I am still flabbergasted that anyone thinks it proves anything at all about AI. I feel really weird about making an assertion like that, because John Searle is a professional philosopher, whereas I do things like consulting on IT matters for companies. I never did philosophy at uni, and really only lately took it up as a distraction against the stresses of running computer systems.
So this is the beginning. I want to start putting down my thinking in this public space, and see if I can evolve a point of view that makes some sense (at least to me), can stand up to reasonable criticism, and leave things open where they should be left open. Doing it in a blog will help me think about it more clearly, even if no-one other than me is reading this!
Anyone who wishes to put some points of view is welcome, of course. Who knows, I might learn something.

